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lli THE SUPRE.I.JE COUR:r OF THE STATE OF UI'AH 
STATE OF UI'AH, in the interest of: 
BABY GIRL W\RIE, case No. 2 
A Person under Eighteen Years of Age 
BRIEF OF RESPO'IDENT 
STA1D1Em' OF THE KIND OF 'lliE CASE 
Th.is is an apt:eal by the natural l!Other fran an Order and JudgiTEnt 
of the Juvenile Court entered oo January 9, 1975, pe:rnanently depriving 
her of all parental rights in oonnectioo with her child, baby girl Marie; 
and fran a decision of the Juvenile Court oo !~By 4, 1976, refusing to 
vacate and set aside as null and void its Order intered oo January 9, 1975. 
DISPOOITICN lli La-IER CX>lJRT 
Th.e Juvenile Court, upon petitioo of the Utah Divisioo of Family 
Services, found that the natural l!Other was unable to adequately provide 
for all the needs of said child and agreed with the !!Dther that it was in 
the best interest of the child for parental rights to be tenninated and 
for the child to be placed for acloptioo. On April 22, 1976, a hearing was 
held at which the Juvenile Court refused to vacate and set aside its order 
of January 9, 19 75, terminating parental rights. 
RELIEF SOlnlT CN APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the Juvenile Court order of January 9, 19 75, 
terminating parental rights, set aside as null and void, and for reversal 
of the Juvenile Court order of May 4, 1976, refusing to vacate its Order of 
January 9, 1975. 
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srATEMENT OF FACT'S 
Respondent substantially agrees with Apfellant' s Staterrent of the 
Facts. Exception is taken, ho.vever, to several voluntary statements which 
are not supported by the record. For example: 
1. It is stated: "Appellant at no t.iJre wanted to give the baby 
up for adoption, but was receiving extrerre pressure from her parents to do 
so .... " (Apt=ellant 's Brief, pg. 2) . There is no direct. testirrony in the 
record about extrerre parental pressure on apt=ellant to give up the baby. 
Attorney Daines quotes the parents only to the effect that appellant 
could not stay hare if she kept the child, (R.lB) and wanted nothing to do 
wit.'fl the baby. (Tr. 2). Apfellant testified only that her parents didn't 
want appellant to keep the baby in their horre because "they just have a 
small apart:rrent." (Tr. 3) . As to Appellant's feelings about giving up the 
baby, it is apparently true that she desired to keep the child (R. 18) , but 
on January 9, 19 75, she appeared at Court intent upJn giving up the baby. 
After a probing discussion with the Court she restated her previous de-
cision that it was in the best interests of the child to give it up and 
voluntarily did so in open court. (Tr. 3). It is a deceptive play on "-Drds 
for Apfellant to state "Apt=ellant at no t.iJre wanted tO give the baby up for 
adoption." It could as accurately be stated that on January 9, 1975, she 
did want to give the baby up. 
2. It is stated twice by Apt=ellant that the DFS Social Worker ad-
vised Apfellant to give up her child for adoption. (Appellant's Brief, 
pg. 2 and 3). That the DFS felt adoption advisable in the best interest of 
the child is evident from the fact that the DFS filed the t=eti tion for 
tennination of parental rights. But there is nothing in the record to 
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indicate that such advice was directly given to Appellant, nor that 
alternative oounsel may not also have been -given to her. 
3. The se=nd paragraph of page 4 of A[Jfellants brief is an 
alleged staterrent of facts as to Apfellants' actions in relation to the 
child during the feriod fran 1-9-75 to March 1976. There is absolutely 
nothing in the re=rd of evidentiary nature oonoeming these activities 
or relating to this feriod of tirre. There is nothing in the rea:>rd that 
would verify Apr:ellant 's alleged interest in the child as reoounted in 
this paragrap-t. 
Respondent suggests a surnnary of the significant established facts 
as follo,.;s: 
1. Ap[:ellant voluntarily plaoes custody of the child in the DFS 
shortly after its birth an or about August 14, 1974. (R.l2). 
2. OF'S files feti tion for termination of parental rights ·oo 
August 22, 19 74. Father served by publicatioo. M:>ther served fersatally 
and advised of right to oounsel. (R. 4) . 
3. Hearing held 10-24-74. Counsel present. CCntinued to Novettber 6. 
4. Hearing held before Judge Roland Anderscn 11-6-74. Counsel 
present. Custody in OF'S cantinted. (R. 13) . 
5. Revised fetition filed by OF'S en 12-2-74. (R. 19). Father served 
by publication. llither served fersonally and advised of right to oounsel (AR 
6. Hearing held before Judge Bradford on 1-9-75. Counsel waived and 
not present. Court finds it is in best interest of child that parental 
rights be terminated and child be placed for adopticn. (R. 20; Tr. 1-4). 
7. Adoption of child finalized August 27, 1975. (Tr. 12). 
8. On one year autaratic review matter tenninated in Juvenile Court 
by Judge Anderson 12-4-75. (R. 21). 
-3-
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9. Petition to set aside and vacate Juvenile Court decree filed 
by Petitioner on April 2, 1976. (R. 33). 
10. Hearing held April 22, 1976. Counsel for Appellant present 
(R. 34; Tr. 1-24). 
11. Memorandum Decision filed by Court 5-11-76. (R. 35-38). 
Court finds: 
(1) Appellant duly afforded counsel and infomed of her 
rights thereto at 1-9-75 hearing. 
(2) Appellant guilty of laches in bringing petition for review. 
(3) Appellant voluntarily relinquished parental rights. 
(4) Appellant was incxxnpetent and incapable of providing 
necessary care for the child. 
(5) It was in the best interest of the drild not to revoke the 
termination order. 
POlliT I. 
THE JUVENilE COURI' HAD NO JURISDICTICN TO 
VACATE ITS PREVIOUSLY EN'IERED ORDER 
Appellant argues that the Juvenile Court has inherent po.Yer, pursuant 
to the provisions of Section 55-10-10~. U.C.~. 1953 as amended, to vacate a 
previous order at any ti.Jre. Respondent submits that this right of review is 
not absolute or unqualified. Section 55-10-106 must be interpreted in pari 
materia with other statutory instruction and applied according to case 
decision. 
l. For exaJlllle, as an adoption nutter has been instituted regarding 
Baby Girl Marie, it is obvious that the right of the Juvenile Court to re-
voke a previous order regarding said child must be tempered by the re-
lationships created in the adoption proceedings. 
-4-
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Section 55-10-78 U.C.A. 1953, in speaking of the juris of the 
Juvenile Court, states "Nothing contained in this act shall deprive the 
district oourts of jurisdiction in adoption proceedings." 
Section 78-30-7 U.C.A. 1953 places exclusive jurisdiction in regard 
to adoption proceedings in the District Court. 
In the case of In re Trimibles' Adoption, 16 Utah 2d 188, 398 P.2d 
25 (1965) , the District Court declined jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding 
to rule on a question of consent to adoption by reason of desertion, taking 
the {X)Sition that the Juvenile Court had exclusive jurisdiction in such 
situation. The Suprerre Court issued a writ of mandamus to the District Court, 
stating: 
Juris of the district oourt in adoption 
proceedings arises when a petition is filed 
with the clerk of the district oourt. Once 
that jurisdiction is ootained the distrra-
=urt is to decide all issues necessary to 
the adoption. The issue of necessity of 
consent because of desertion, when such issue 
arises, is a necessary issue to be decided 
by the district oourt. The juvenile oourt is 
a creature of statute and a oourt of limited 
jurisdiction ... To follo,..r the necessary pro-
cedural steps in ootaining juvenile =urt 
jurisdiction every tirre the issue of necessity 
of oonsent arose would be to introduce oon-
fusion into the adoption proceedings. 
(Ibid, 39 8 P. 2d 26 ; enphas is added) . 
We submit that once the jurisdiction of the District Court was invoked 
by the filing of an adoption petition, the jurisdiction of the District Court 
becarre pararrount in deciding all issues necessary to the adoption, including 
whether or not Appellant voluntarily consented to texmination of the parental 
rights and whether or not she was afforded due process in the tennination 
prcceeding. The Juvenile Court has lost jurisdiction to reoonsider and re-
voke its termination order by the intervention of the District Court in the 
adoption proceeding. To hold otherwise M:Juld put the Juvenile Court on a 
-5-
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oollision course with the District Court, allCMing it, by revocation of a 
previous termination order, to interfere with a new parent-child relation-
ship created by the District Court. Or, assuming the District Court ignores 
or refuses to recognize any change in status ordered by the Juvenile Court, 
then the entire review procedure by the Juvenile Court beCO!TEs an effort in 
futility. The chaos that could result, by recognizing any continuing juris-
diction by the Juvenile Court over baby girl Marie, staggers the mind. 
None of the cases cited by Appellant as authority for the Juvenile 
Court to reopen a case and rrodify its prior order involve circumstances where 
there has been intervening jurisdiction interposed by a constitutional court 
of unlimited jurisdiction involving the sarre matter previously disposed of 
in the Juvenile Court. 
2. In any event, the Juvenile Court can of its o,.m p:::JWer, and did 
in this.case, terminate its continuing jurisdiction. Section 55-10-101 
U.C.A. 1953 provides: "The continuing jurisdiction of the court shall 
terminate (1) Upon order of the court .... " etc. 
Pursuant to the very authority argued by Appellant, the Juvenile Court 
terminated the decree entered by it on January 9, 1975, at a review hearing. 
(R. 21) The question of review and revocation, urged by Appellant, is 
actually m::x:>t. There is nothing for the Juvenile Court to rrodify or set aside 
The order under consideration no longer exists and the court's continuing 
jurisdicticn in relation to the substance thereof has been terminated. 
3. It is also submitted that rrodification of the termination order, 
which of necessity could also modify the custody order made a part thereof, 
is specifically prevented by statute. Section 55-10-108 U.C.A. 1953 reads: 
-6-
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No petition by a parent may be filed under 
this section (m:xlification of custody order) 
after his or her parental rights have been 
terminated in accordance with Section 55-10-109. 
The intent of the Legislature seems to be that a parent does not have 
standing before the court to petition for restoration of custody once a 
termination order has been entered. The reason is cbvious. There can be 
no certainty in regard to future disposition of a drild if a parent may 
petition for m:xlification of a decree once termination of parental rights 
has been ordered. The available recourse to the parent is appeal. (Section 
55-10-109(3)). 
4. Third parties are no.~ vitally oonoerned in any revocation of the 
termination order; viz the adoptive parents. Their rights have nGI inter-
vened and must be CXXJsidered. As they were not arrl ~d not be parties in 
a Juvenile Court proceeding, we sul:xnit the Juvenile Court J10,ol has no juris-
diction to revoke the termination order in derogaticn of their interest in 
the adoptive dlild. This matter cannot nG~ be reconsidered by the Juvenile 
Court in a vacuum, ignoring the very vital concerns of the adoptive parents, 
in considering whether a ca1sent to place for adopticn ma.y be revoked. In 
the instant case the equities should surely be heavily balanced an the side 
of the adoptive parents who have had the child since birth as against a 
rrother who waited 15 rronths to challenge a terminaticn decree. 
In St.nll1'arY, therefore, it is sul:xnitted, that the Juvenile Court has 
no jurisdiction to m:xlify, set aside or otherwise reconsider its order of 
January, 1975, terminating Appellant's parental rights for these reasons: 
1. The jurisdiction of the District Court, as a result of the 
adoption proce€dings, is no.v pararrount and exclusive in regard to termination 
of Appellant's parental rights. 
-7-
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2. The Juvenile Court 1 by its = act in terminating the tennina tion 
order 1 has disoontinued its continuing jurisdiction over the mtter. 
3. The parents only recourse by statute fran a termination order 1 
is appeal. 
4. Intervening rights of the adoptive parents preclude reassertion 
of jurisdiction by the Juvenile Court. 
PO:rnl' II. 
APPELLANI' DID Nor TIMELY APPEAL 
'lhe hearing regarding termination of Appellant's parental rights was 
held on January 9, 1975. (R. 18). Findings of Fact and a Decree ordering 
that Marie be placed in the custody of the Utah State DFS for the purpose 
of adoption were entered by Juvenile Court Judge Charles Bradford on the 
same date, January 9, 1975. (R. 20) 
Section 55-10-109(3) provides: 
( 3) Unless there is an appeal fran the order 
terminating the rights of one or both parents I the 
order permanently terminates the legal parent-child 
relationship and all the rights and duties, includ-
ing residual parental rights and duties of the 
parents or parents involved. 
Section 55-10-112 U.C.A. 1953 provides: 
An appeal to the Suprerre Court my be taken 
from any order, decree, or judgrrent of the 
juvenile oourt ... The appeal must be taken within 
one m::mth fran the entry of the order, decree, or 
judgm:mt appealed from. (emphasis added). 
'lherefore the appeal ti.rre on the January 9, 19 75 order expired 
February 9, 1975. Appeal was the only recourse open to Appellant from the 
January 9, 1975 Order. Technically, an appeal has never been taken fran 
that Order. (The Notice of Appeal filed in this case on May ll I 19 76 1 is 
from the order of the Juvenile Court dated May 4 I 19 76, not from the 
January 9, :!.975 order. See R. 44). Assuming the Juvenile Court had no 
-8-
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jurisdiction to hear the Petition to Vacate, as argued by Respondent under 
Poi. •t I, and that Appellant has never in fact appealed from the January 9, 
1975 Order as herein pointed out, this appeal is illusory and soould .be 
dis:nissed. 
Irrespective of such position, and assuming an appeal has been taken 
as apparently intended by Appellant from both the January 9, 1975 order and 
the May 4, 19 76 decision, it is nevertheless herewith argued that this 
appeal is untirrely and that Appellant is estopped from this appeal because 
of laches. 
The Petion to Set Aside and Vacate A Decree Terminating Parental 
Ri<tlts was filed by Appellant on April 2, 1976. (R. 33). This 15 IIDI'lths 
after the Decree was entered on January 9, 19 75. (R 20) . During this time 
Baby Girl Marie had been placed for adoption, the adoption finalized and the 
child gra..m from an infant of 5 l!Dnths to a toddler of 20 !!Dnths, stabilizing 
herself in the home of her adoptive parents. 
The record reflects no attempt by Appellant or any attorney on her 
beJ-talf to petition the court for review of the January 9, 1975 Decree until 
April 5, 1976. Appellant argues that she was an unexperienced juvenile, un-
wed l!Dther, of age 16 caught up in a tralD11atic experience and therefore 
could not be expected to be aware of the technical points of law. The 
record belies any clam that Appellant was an inexperienced litigant. Appellant 
was present in Juvenile Court with counsel on at least bolo occassions -
10-24-74 and ll-6-74 (R. 9, R. 13). Certainly she was aware of the avail-
ability of counsel ~1-toul::Jshe be of a mind to contest the January 9, 1975 
order. The fact is that on January 9 she was resolved to give up the baby, did 
n0t wunt counsel, and had no intenti~n to resist a Termination Grder. (Tr. 1,3); 
Tr. 2,4,11,15). Appellctnt paints the picture of a distraught l!Dther, spending 
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a frantic year trying to learn of her child, and finally going to legal 
counsel on advise of the DFS social worker 15 rronths later. (Appellant's 
brief, pg. 4). At what !X)int did the rrother's resolve of January 9 to give 
up her baby change? At that !X)int why didn't she go to her forrrer counsel, 
with whcm she was familiar for advise? \\'hy would the social worker wait 
15 rronths before recomrending the Appellant see an attorney? Are we to 
believe there was scme attempt by the social ~o:orker to deceive the rrother, 
scme dereliction of duty on the part of her forrrer counsel who was well aware 
of the proceedings, or scme conspiracy between the both of them to hurt this 
yoliDg frightened rrother? It appears rrore to be a rather delayed case of 
seller's rem:lrse, which wouldn't be quite so tragic if we were dealing with 
a piece of goods rather than a living child. 
Appellant contends that laches dces not apply in this case because 
Appellant was not advised of her right to appeal. (App=llant' s Brief pg. 8) . 
Judge Bradford admits that he did not orally so advise the Appellant at the 
conclusioo of the termination hearing. (R. 36). We suggest hio mitigating 
factors: First, Section 55-10-96 U.C.A. 1953, tJIXm which Appellant relies, 
does not require the Juvenile Court to advise the parent of his right to 
appeal at the conclusion of a hearing unless the parent was not represented 
by CO\ID"'d· Appellant was not represented by counsel at this particular 
hearing, but she had been throughout the proceedings. Appellant could have 
had counsel at the hearing if she had so desired, and counsel 'd3.S a·.-:are of 
the January 9, 19 75 hearing and t.!-Je purpose t.'1ereof. ( R. 34 , Tr. 1, 4) . In 
view of these circurrstances it seems insignificant and unprejudicial t.".at 
the Juvenile Court Judge said nothing aboc;t a;:cpeal at the co:~cl·..1sio:. of t.'le 
January 9 hearing. In any event it is ,_::-cbu.ble that he di::: so before the 
hearing. (Tr. 2,15). Secondly, .?\pp2lla:-:t ad:!lCM'le:::;es t:-.st :'..c:Jpella""!t a:-:-
peared at the Januar; 9 hearing "in res,_:c:-.se to a srr-or:s." ··:::x··lcrts :0:-i·:c:: 
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?~. 3, A.""~.. 1) . If this is the case then Appellant was aware fran the srnncns 
-::-.at she had a right of appeal as the legend on the surmo:1s reads: 
To Parent{s), Guardian or Custodian-
{6) You ffi3.Y appeal the Judge's decision to the 
Utah Suprer.e Court if initiated within 30 days 
of the Juvenile Court Judge's decision. 
The doctrine of "lacl1es" is defined as folla.-s: 
The established doctrine of equity that, 
apart fran any question of statutory limitation 
its oourts will disoourage delay and sloth in 
the enforcerre.:1 t of rights . Equity demands 
=cscience, cpod faith and reasonable diligence. 
In their absence t."le oourt will not act. The 
object of the doctrine of laches is to exact of 
the o::nplaina."'lt fair dealing with his adversary 
a"'ld the rule was adopted larely beca'.lSe after 
great lapse of tirre, from death of parties, loss 
of papers, death of witnesses, change of title, 
intervention of equities, or other causes, there 
is danger of doing injustice, and there can be no 
longer a safe detennination of the controversy. 
{The Self-Pronouncing Law Dictionary, Secald 
Stu:Jents Edition, I..awyers ~ative Plbli.shing 
Co., Rochester, New York, pg. 473). 
'I'Oe sul:xni t that the p::lSi tion of ~llant in this rratter is on all fours 
·~·::.th this definition. This oourt should not oountenance ~llant's delay in 
seeki...-.s .::-evocation of a 15 ::or:t.'1 old oourt order, especially in view of the 
.:..."'lten,en::ion of t.'lird-?=ty ec;.rities and t."'le grave danger of cbin3 injustice 
::.o sald ?CJ.rt.ies. Resp:mdent e.r:tirely agrees wi t."'l ~lant t."'lat this is an 
eq-_;,j, ::y ::-a ::<:e.::- o: the :-..l.;f'.est ::egree. ·..we ca"'l."XJt oonsider t."'lis ::atter i."'l an 
C";-.e t."'lecr-1 · o!' lac:-:es f:x:-..l.Ses ·.1;:on t:.o.·o eler.ents. (l) Lack of diligence 
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time between relinquishrrent and attempted revocation. In the case of D-- P-
v. Social Service and Child w. Dept., 19 u~ 2d 311, 431 P.2d 547 (1967), this 
court ordered restoration of custody to a natural mther. The court discussed 
at sorre length the diligence exercised by the natural mther, being obviously 
influenced thereby. In that case the natural mther executed a release to 
the social agency within 24 hours follo.Ying the birth of her child. Seven days 
later she contacted her doctor in an effort to get the baby. Five days later 
she contacted the placerrent agency for the sarre purpose. Four days later a 
petition was filed - only three weeks and one day after the birth of the baby. 
Trial was held when the baby was only one mnth old - two weeks later the 
findings and conclusions were signed. The court, of course, was infhenced 
by other things, including the mther's physical state at the time she gave 
the consent as well as the fact that as of the date of trial petition for 
adoption had not been filed. But the court then contrasted that case with 
other Utah cases where longer waiting periods had been involved with different 
results. The diligence of the natural mther and the lack of injury to 
respondent attributable to her were to a large part dispositive of the case. 
In the instant case to the converse the lack of diligence on the part of the 
mther with resultant grave injury to the real respondents (adoptive parents) 
certainly would dictate a much different result. Mr. Justice Crockett re-
cognized these variables and even that intervening rights may be vested when 
he stated in an earlier case: 
Reading of many cases on this subject teaches 
that each depends upon its ONn facts: the circum-
stances of the placerrent of the child, those under 
which the consent was given, the length of time the 
adopting parents have had the child, any "vested rights" 
that have intervened, the welfare and the 
-12-
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child; the a:mduct, as well as the character 
and ability of the respective claimants; these 
and the particular governing statute are all 
given consideration in determining whether the 
consent can be revoked. (In re Adoption of D. 
122 Utah 525, 252 P.2d 223 (1953)). 
Applyinq these considerations as if a test as to whether t:ennination 
of parental rights should be revoked in the instant case a fair application 
dictates as follows: 
1. The child was placed by an authorized goverrurent agency with no 
questions as to the appropriateness thereof. 
2. A consent to the termination of parental rights was voluntarily 
given in open court after considered resolve. 
3. The child is rDN alnost two years old, has never been in the 
custody of the natural rrother, and has been in an adoptive house for over one 
year. 
4. The welfare of the child is obviously best served in the hate of 
the adoptive parents. The natural rrother still resides with parents (appellant's 
brief pg. 4) who refuse to board the child or have anything to do with it, and 
there has been no evidence produced that she is in any way better able to 
provide and care for the child now than when the Juvenile Court found her 
inCXJ¥tant and incapable of providing the necessary care for the child." 
(R 35) 
5. As to the "application of a particular governing statute" this will 
be treated in the next point. 
It is submitted, therefore, that laches prevents any revocation of the 
previous termination order. 
-13-
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POlliT III. 
THE APPELLANT Is PARENTAL RICHI'S 
WERE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY TERMINATED 
BY THE JUVENILE COURT. 
Appellant goes to some lengths to analyze Section 55-10-109 U.C.A. 
1953 (Tennination of Parental Rights) and quotes several cases providing 
various examples of "conduct or condition seriously detri.rrental to a child" 
wherein tennination was or was not upheld under said statue. We take no 
particular issue with the analysis of the statute. We simply contend that 
the statute does have application in the instant case. Section 55-10-109 (1) {a) 
provides: I 
(1) The court rray decree a termination of 
all parental rights with respect to one or both 
parents if the court finds: 
(a) That the parent or parents are 
unfit or incanpetent by reason of conduct or 
condition seriously detrirrental to the child; 
or . • • • (errq:ilasis added) . 
That the Petition for Termination {R. 19) alleges appellant was "not 
at fault" does not prevent termination where a condition seriously detrirrental 
to the child exists, appellants argurrent to the contrary. There was a reason 
why the Legislature added the phrase "or condition" - a reason aptly illustrate: 
by the present case. After reviewing the facts that (1) The child in the 
care of appellant would be homeless, ( 2) The appellant could not provide 
financial support for the child, { 3) The appellant 1 s parents v.>ere unwilling 
to care for the child, {4) The natural father was unkno,.m and had no interest 
{R. 19,20). {5) And that after 15 rronths there was no indication the cir-
cumstances had changed, the court properly concluded that its original order 
of January 9, 1975 terminating parental rights because of such conditions 
involving the natural parents was in the best interest of the child and 
there was no reason to revoke said order 14 rronths later. The Juvenile Court, 
-14-
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trier of the facts with direct infonre.tion and impression regarding the 
circumstances, found that the appellant wa.S- in fact in~tent and incapable 
of providing necessary care for the child, a "oonditton seriously detrimental 
to the child" as the statute requires. In open rourt appellant agreed all 
these conditions were true. (Tr. 3) Try as we may we cannot see how the 
provisions of Section 55-10-109 (1) (a) do not fit the instant case. as a~llant 
contends. 
It should be rerrerbered that the Juvenile Court treated this case as a 
hybrid situation under both the involuntary termination provisions of Section 
109 (1) and a voluntary termination under Section 55-10-109 (5). (R. 35). 
Appellant says the court cannot do this. (Appellant's Brief, pg 12-13) Why 
not? H~ else could the interest of the child be protected where the IIDther 
voluntarily relinquishes and the father is l.ll'lkncMn. Why can't the Juvenile 
Court hang a terminaticn on "both pegs?" As we read the c::ourts Merorand\ml 
Decision, he terminated the unknown father's rights on an involuntary basis, 
and tre appellant rrother' s parental rights on both a voluntary and an in-
voluntary basis. (R. 35) Does that do violence to the statute? There is no 
disjunctive function word between Sections 55-10-109(1) and 55-10-109(5). 
AssU!TE a situation where an involuntary petition for termination of parental 
rights is filed against X. X is served. X voluntary appears at the hearing 
and voluntary relinquishes his rights. Would appellant have us take the 
position that the court could not act and that the proceeding was a nullity? 
Does appellant seriously contend that because appellant voluntarily consented 
the tennination order as to the unknown father is void and he still has 
parental riqhts in the child? (Appellant's Brief, p. 17) · 
We conclude that ,;ppellu.nt 's parental rights were legally and properly 
tenninated by the Juvenile Court. 
-15-
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POINT IV. 
APPELLANT WAS Nai' DE:'JIED HER 
RIGIT TO COUNSEL AT THE HE.ZIJUNG 00 
THE PSTITION TO TERMINATE PARENTAL 
RIGW1'S. 
Appellant argues that she was denied the right to =unsel at the 
January 9, 1975 tennination of parental rights hearing. This argurrent is 
based upon the fact that the transcript typed from a re=rding of the January 
9, 19 75 hearing indicates no reference to representation of counsel for 
Appellant. 
This issue was raised at the hearing on the Petition to Set Aside And 
Vacate a Decree Terminating Parental Rights held on April 22, 1976 (Tr. 2-23). 
The Juvenile Court Judge addressed the issue in his Memorandum Decision of 
May 4, 1976 (R. 35-38). He ooncluded that the petitioner (Appellant) was 
duly afforded oounsel and duly infomed of her rights thereto. 
In that decision the Judge reoounts that Appellant had been represented 
by oounsel at three prior proceedings involving the same parties and sub-
stantially the same issues. Attorney William Daines had been app::>inted 
by the oourt for Appellant at the first hearing, after she was advised of 
her right to oounsel and indicated her desire for appointed representation. 
Mr. Daines stood ready to appear with appellant at the January 9, 1975 hear-
ing, acoording to the judge, but was not wanted by the appellant. (Deputy 
County Attorney Jones proffered proof at the hearing that Attorney Daines, 
who had represented Appellant in the past, stated that aprellant had =ntactee 
him but had decided to proceed without =unsel. (R 34) . 
The Merrorandurn Decision also sets forth the re=llection of the court 
that a discussion was had by and aJTDng Aprellant, the County Attorney, 
Division of Family Services workers and the =urt regardinq the nnther' s 
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decision to corre before tl1<:1 court and voluntarily relinquish her rights to 
P~1· Girl Marie by not contesting the Petition to Terminate Parental Rights. 
The court was convinced that Appellant neither wanted nor needed counsel for 
the January 9, 1975 proceedings. Section 55-10-109 (2) requires only that 
parties to a termination proceeding be advised of their right to counsel. 
Actual presence of counsel is not predicated to a valid proceeding. A right 
to be represented by counsel does not inply that a party must have counsel 
even against their a..m wishes or desires. 
Respondent would urge the court to consider the transcript of both 
the January 9, 1975 hearing and the April 22, 1976 hearing on the Petition to 
Vacate (Tr. 1-4; 1-23) and, further, the Merrorandum Decision of the court dated 
May 4, 1976 (R. 35-38). Summons personally served upon Appellant (R.A 1) in 
connection with the January 9, 1975 hearing specifically advised a~llant of 
her right to counsel, as well as her right to a~al. These parts of the 
rea::>rd in particular, and the record read as a whole, refute Appellant's claim 
that she was denied the right to counsel. 
POINI' V. 
THE EVIDENCE FULLY SUPPORI'S THE OEX::ISICN 
BY THE JUVE:ULE COORI' 'ro ORDER A TERMINATICN OF 
THE P~AL RIGn'S OF THE APPELI.J'..NT. 
The Statutory test for termination of parental rights requires a find-
ing of conduct or condition that is seriously detrirrental to the child. 
(Section 55-10-109 (a) U.C.A. 1953). Proof must be by a "preponderence of 
evidence." (State v. Lance, 23 Utah 2d 407, 464 P.2d 395 (1970). 
In the instant case the Juvenile (trial) court found: (1) The ITOther 
was unwed. (2) The natural father was unkno.m and could not be determined 
by the court. ( 3) The natural ITOther was unable to adequately provide for 
all the needs vf tl"w chiU (4) The rmtcmal grandparents refused to care for 
or provide a hom::: for the child. (5) The natural ITOther (appellant) agreed 
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it was in the best interest of the child for parental rights to be 
terminated and the child be placed for adoption. (R. 18,20) At the time 
of t.he subsequent hearing 15 rronths later the conditions had not changed. 
(R. 38) The record supports the findings as to said =nditions and 
appellant has not ccr~tradicted the existence of said =nditions in its brief 
on appeal. 
In effect the child was at birth horreless and would have, and apparently 
still would be, in that sarre condition if custody had been mintained with 
or were naN restored to appellant. It is impossible to conceive a circumstan02 
rrore seriously detrimental to the child. The preponderence of the evidience 
certainly substantiates that it was in the best interest of the child to 
terminate the appellant's parental rights. There is actually no evidence to 
the contrary. The only evidentiary grounds left to appellant is the pre-
sumption of preference afforded to the natural rrother - to which, ha..Jever, 
the welfare of the child is pararrount. (In re State In Interest of Jennings, 
20 Utah 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (1967). 
Appellant cites the dissent of Chief Justice Henriod in the case of 
State of Utah, in the interest of T.G. 532 P. 2d 997 (1975) in arguing in-
sufficency of evidence in the instant case. In the T .G. case the mjority 
opinion affirmed a termination order of the Juvenile Court on findings by that 
court that (1) The natural rrother had no necessary skills to train and 
supervise a child, (2) housekeeping standards jeopardized the child's well 
being, and (3) the natural rrother was of la..J rroral standards. \~e sutmit 
none of these circumstances, as detrimental as they may be, are as detri-
rrental as being horreless. Justice Henroid d<issented, not on the basis of 
insufficiency of evidence, but because he has a question regard in'] the= con-
stitutionality of the termination statute itself, in view of the p2rm:mcncy 
of deprivation authorized thereby. 
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Apr:ellant also cites the case of State of Utah, in the interest of 
Pitts, 535 P.2d 1244 (1975) as additional authority for insufficiency of 
evidence in the instant case. We believe the Pitts case is clearly dis-
tin:JUishable fro.'11 the instant case for nany reasons. In the Pitts case 0;o 
infant children were left at a hotel in care of a friend by the natural 
parents. The hotel had a fire and the children were delivered by the friend 
to the paternal grandrrother. The grandrrother kept the children for a time 
until she could no longer care for them, and then delivered them to the 
Division of Family Services. The DFS subsequently filed a r:etition for 
temination of parental rights which was granted by the Juvenile Court. The 
natural parents then appealed frun a refusal of the Juvenile Court to vacate 
such order. Evidence in the Pitts case indicated the foll(7.oling distinctions 
from our present case: (1) The natural parents were not duly notified of 
nor present at the original temination hearing. (2) The natural rother had 
ITB.intained contact with the children and !l'ade efforts to see to their care 
whe:1 absent from them. ( 3) The natural parents had not given their consent 
to tennination of parental rights. (4) The DFS had not !l'ade diligent in-
quiry to locate the parents. (5) There was no evidence the children had been 
placed for adoption. 
These di ffcrences are greatly significant and present a whole different 
situation from the instant case, where a homeless infant, never in the care of 
the natural rmtJ1er, father W1kJ1(7.oln, is placed for adoption with the consent of 
the n<Jtural rmtller adopted, and rronths later a revocation is attempted. 
Appella:1t also cites ilie case of State of Utah, in the Interest of 
Inc:c Pillinq, C't al, 23 lit. 2d 407, 464 P.2d 393 (1970), wherein a juvenile 
crurt tcnni:-utinc1 order •.-:1s reversed by this court. Once again the case is 
clcJdy distic1! lish_tblc ft-'nl the instant case. In the Pilling case , three 
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daughters and one son were taken from the parents by the Juve01ile Court. 
Custody of the three daughters was placed with their natural father, a 
previous husband, and all parental rights were terminated to the son. The 
distinguishing facts are as follo.vs: (l) The children were older, two 
being of school age, and had lived with their mother for soiTE tine. (2) No 
evidence that mother would not or oould not oorrect certain proble:ns in the 
home was introduced. (3) The natural parents had not consented to termination 
(4) The juvenile court had withheld certain "secret evidence" (social reports) 
from the appellant, and (5) there had been no adoption of the children. 
We submit that the evidence adduced in the instant case clearly pre-
ponderated a condition seriously detrinental to the child and supported the 
termination order. 
POINT VI 
THE WELFARE OF THE CHILD AND FINDlliGS 
OF THE JUJENILE COURT lli RELATION THERErO ARE 
OF PARAMJLNT CONSIDERATIOO ON REVIEW BY THIS 
COURI'. 
Though the presunption that a natural mother is the best parental in-
fluence on a child has been recognized by this court, a paramount interest 
has been enunciated as follo.vs: 
While ordinarily the parents have a right 
to custody of their c..'1ildren, the State also 
has an interest in the welfare of children, 
which is paramount thereto. (In re State of Utah 
in the interest of Ronald Jenm.ngs, et al. , 60 
Utah 2d 50, 432 P.2d 879 (1967). 
We submit the Juvenile Court, in the interest of Baby Girl Marie, rude 
the right decision in terminating the parental rights of appella'lt, and later 
in refusing to set aside such decision after the adoption of the child. 
Hearings in Juvenile Court involving custody of children are not adverse, but 
are highly equitable in nature, designed to inquire into the welfare of the 
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children, not the desires of the parents. (State in the Interest of K- s--, 
7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958). No one has a "right" in the life of another 
hU!T13J1 being =ntrary to the happiness or best interest of said being. 
It is also axiaratic that the trial judge, because of his closeness 
to the situation, has a good vantage p::Jint regarding the evidence. As stated 
by this =urt: 
Becuase of the advantage p::Jssessed by 
the trial judge, we feel reluctant to d!ange 
his findings unless we are =nvinced that they 
are not supported by the evidence. (In re State 
of utah in the Interest of Ronald Jennings, et al. , 
supra). 
We are aware the =urt is sanewhat sensitive about being reminded of 
this axian, but we submit that it is particularly apropos in the instant case, 
particularly as to the demeanor and understanding of the appellant at the 
January 9 , 19 75 termination hearing. 
CXJN.:LUSION 
Resp::Jndent is not unsympathetic or calloused to the alleged position 
and feelings of the natural !IDther, appellant in this case. The writer of 
this brief has been on the natural !IDthers' side. (D-- P-- v. SOcial Services, 
supra). We agree with Appellant's =unsel that extrerre grief will unooubtedly 
occur not matter how the question is finally resolved. 
But our sympathies with the young !IDther should not be allowed to clou1 
our vision or understanding of the true circumstances of this case. The 
procedural rights of appellant 1-:ere not denied or circumvented. She was 
advised of her right both to =unsel and to appeal in relation to the January 9 
tennination hearing. (SI.llTlTDns- AR 1, ~le!IDrandum Decision - R 38) . She was 
ad'iised in the Sl.llTlTDns that it v.'as prop::Jsed to terminate her parental rights, 
as the statute rec~ires. The Juvenile Court judge also probed her under-
standing of this p::Jssibility with her. There was no disregard for procedural 
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due process nor haste in the proceedings, except as may have been dictated 
and justified by the circumstances of the child. 
The fact remains that appellant had no way to provide for her child, 
or at least gave no evidence of such ability or effort to find a way. Though 
this circumstance may be a tragic indictment of our social degeneration, it 
cannot be allowed to prejudice the horreless, helpless, unresponsible infant. 
A o:mdition seriously detrirrental to the child existed, the Juvenile Court 
had little choice than to proceed as it did. 
As a matter of legal principles, we believe this case presents the 
oourt, arrong other things, with opportunity to clearly enunciate a position 
in regard to jurisdiction to revie-J termination orders when adoption pro-
ceedings have intervened, as argued in our Point I. 
We urge the Court to affirm the termination order of the Juvenile Court 
and its subsequent refusal to vacate said order. 
Respectfully submitted 
Franklyn B. Matheson 
Assistant AttoiTiey General 
AttoiTiey for Respondent 
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